

W. S. 965

DUPLICATE

BUREAU OF MILITARY HISTORY 1913-21
BURO STAIRÉ MILEATA 1913-21
No. W.S. 965

ROINN  COSANTA.

BUREAU OF MILITARY HISTORY, 1913-21.
STATEMENT BY WITNESS.

DOCUMENT NO. W.S. 965

Witness

Tadg McCarthy,
Cork Road,
Mallow,
Co. Cork.

Identity.

Member of Donoughmore Irish Volunteers,
Co. Cork, 1915 - ;
Engineer, Mallow Batt'n. 1920.
Adjutant, do. 1921.

Subject.

Irish Volunteers, Mallow, Co. Cork,
1915-1923.

Conditions, if any, Stipulated by Witness.

R11

File No. 3-2254

Form B.S.M. 2

DUPLICATE

W. S. 965

STATEMENT by Tadhg McCarthy,

Cork Road,

Mallow.

BUREAU OF MILITARY HISTORY 1913-21

BURO STAIRÉ MILEATA 1913-21

No. W.S. 965

I was born at Gurrane, Lombardstown, on the 6th January 1895. My parents were farmers.

My father and a number of his relatives were associated with the Fenian Movement and I often heard them talk about the happenings in 1867. Usually when they spoke about certain happenings at that time, which they did not think we should hear, they spoke in Irish.

My first contact with the Irish Volunteers occurred on the occasion of a visit to my cousin (Paddy Looney) at his home in Donoughmore in 1915. Paddy was one of the founder members of the Irish Volunteers in his area and was a keen organiser. There were no Volunteers in my home area at this time so I joined the Donoughmore Company. Donoughmore is about 6 miles from Gurrane where I resided at the time. As far as I can recollect, the officer in charge of Donoughmore Company at this time was Jack Manning, Graunredmond, Donoughmore. I cannot remember the names of the other officers.

The strength of the Company was about 60. The usual foot drill and parades were held, generally at weekends, and there was always a good attendance. As a member of the Donoughmore Unit I took part in the St. Patrick's Day Parade in Cork in 1916. I distinctly remember that, on this occasion, the Volunteers were involved in several clashes with "Separation-Allowance Women" (wives of British soldiers) during the course of the evening after the parade had been dismissed, and the units had broken up into individual groups. The majority of the members of my Company were armed with shotguns on

the day of the parade, but some few carried pikes. I did not carry any arms on this occasion.

At this time Donoughmore Company was in the 6th Battalion, Cork Brigade. I do not recollect the names of the Battalion officers.

The Donoughmore Company paraded at Beeing Cross on Easter Sunday 1916 but I was not present as I was seriously ill at the time.

Following the release of the internees and prisoners after the Rising the Volunteers were organised in my home area in the Spring of 1917. The district was visited by Tomás McCurtain, Fred Murray and Seán O'Sullivan - all from Cork City. On the formation of the Volunteers in my home district - the unit was known as Ahadillane Company - I transferred to the new unit from Donoughmore. The Captain of the Ahadillane Coy. was:-

Jerry Buckley (now Constellation Bar, Cork).

I cannot recollect the names of the other officers but others, who were pioneer members were:- Tim Shea, Tim Sexton, Batt Walsh and Mick Healy. Ahadillane Company was one of the units in the newly formed Mallow Battalion, Cork Brigade. The other companies in this Battalion were:- Analeentha, Burnfoot, Mallow, Lombardstown, Ballyclough, Two-pot-house. At a later stage Ahadillane Company was divided as the area was too large and a new Company was formed in Dromahane (Captain Tim Sexton). During 1917 parades were held regularly at weekends and in order to establish closer contact between the units, a football league (G. A. A.) was organised between the companies in the Battalion. This league also catered for Grenagh and Donoughmore Companies of the neighbouring Donoughmore Battalion.

At this time the Volunteers in the area were active in the formation of Sinn Féin Clubs. The majority of such clubs were composed mainly of Volunteers and the members of their families. Units of Cumann na mBan were also organised in each Company area. In most cases, the members of the organisation were sisters or other relatives of Volunteers. There was no Fianna organisation in the rural areas here.

During early portion of 1918 normal training and parades were carried out. When Conscription was threatened by the British the strength of the Ahadillane Company increased to about 150. Nearly every man in the district who was physically fit joined the Volunteers. All the new recruits continued to serve as Volunteers until the Conscription scare had passed when the majority gradually detached themselves from the organisation. About this time (June 1918) I went to the Agricultural College, Ballyhaise, Co. Cavan, where I remained as a student until October 1919. During my final session in the College I discovered 12 rounds of .38 pinfire revolver ammunition hidden in the harness room in the College and I took the ammunition home with me. On my return I rejoined Ahadillane Company whose officers at this time were (I think)

Captain - Batt Walsh
1st Lieut. - Mick Healy.

The Company was now in Mallow Battalion Cork II Brigade, Mallow Battalion becoming, I think, 2nd Battalion of this Brigade.

About the end of 1919, following my return from Ballyhaise, I decided that I should make some arrangement to keep arms, documents and equipment in some place where they were unlikely to be discovered by the enemy raiding parties. My first attempt at dumping arms concerned the hiding of my own shot gun. In this case I fitted two

brackets to the frame of the kitchen table on the inside so arranged that the shotgun could be fitted into them. This hiding place was never discovered although the house was searched on innumerable occasions. Later on small arms dumps were made by putting a hinged cover on a 56 lb. butter box which had been well waterproofed and then fitting same into the centre of a double bank usually stonefaced and preferably at a corner site.

Rifles and shotguns were usually hidden in dumps built into fences at gaps in fences where there was plenty traffic of animals. The principal dump used by me was made by waterproofing a wooden container about 8' long 1' wide and 2½' high and building same into the centre of the fence at a gap. One end of the container had a hinged door and this end was faced towards the gap. The end of the fence at the gap was blocked by a large stone flag into which an "eye" for hanging a gate was fitted. (This gave the flag the appearance of a permanent fixture).

While on the matter of dumps I would like to state that on one occasion I filled a shell case (taken from "The Upnor" in a raid by Cork I Brigade) with documents and sealed it with putty. It was buried in the centre of a double fence and when examined some 15 years later the contents were in perfect condition.

At this time (early 1920) the usual drills and parades were held - the training was becoming a little bit more advanced as scouting classes and target practice were being held. In April 1920 (Easter) a general instruction to destroy all vacated R. I. C. posts and the contents of Income Tax offices was secured from G. H. Q. but as there were none of these in the Company area there was no activity under these headings.

In May 1920, together with about 30 other members of Ahadillane Company, I took part in a raid on O'Brien's house at Inchmay in an endeavour to capture one of the robbers who raided Millstreet Bank (Hugh O'Brien). The wanted man was not at home but he was captured at a later stage by the Brigade Column. This ^{raid} arrest was carried out on the instruction of Battalion O/C (Paddy McCarthy). The raiding party was in charge of Mick Healy who was O/C Ahadillane Coy. at this time.

During the summer of 1920 numerous raids for arms were carried out in the area. Approximately 30 shotguns and a small amount of ammunition for same were seized. These raids were carried out by Ned Waters, Jerry Hanlon, Tadg McCarthy (witness), Batt Walsh, Dave Barrow, Denis Horgan and several others.

I think that it was about this time that Republican Courts were established in each parish. The Courts were composed of representatives of the different Sinn Féin Clubs in the parish. In this connection I would like to point out that there were three Sinn Féin Clubs - one in each Volunteer Company area - in Kilshannig parish where I resided. I was appointed a member of the Court for Ahadillane area, Wm. O'Callaghan (later Senator O'Callaghan, Longueville, Mallow) was appointed for Dromahane and Mick Hallinan for Lombardstown district. When necessary, sittings of the Court were held alternately in the different areas. The only cases decided by the Courts of which I was a member were local cases of trespass. All were satisfactorily settled without imposing penalties.

The Brigade Column was formed in September 1920 and was undergoing training in the Battalion area at Mourne Abbey. The column was in charge of Liam Lynch, Brigade O/C, while Ernie O'Malley was in charge of training

at Mourne Abbey. As far as I can recollect, the members of the column were:-

Liam Lynch	Dan Vaughan, Boherbee
Ernie O'Malley	Tom Coughlan, Charleville
Jack Cunningham, Mallow	Dan Shinnick, Castletownroche
Paddy O'Brien, Liscarrol	Jim O'Neill, do.
Mick Sullivan, Meelin	Dan Daly, Rathcormac
Paddy McCarthy, do.	Geo. Power, Fermoy
Dan Brown, do.	Lar Condon, do.
Patk. Healy, Millstreet.	

At this time Dick Willis (painter) and Jackie Bolster (carpenter) were working in Mallow Barracks. They reported

to their Company O/C Jack Cunningham that they thought the barracks which housed a party of British Military (17th Lancers) to the number of about 50, could be captured. This information was conveyed to the Brigade O/C (Liam Lynch). He sent for Dick Willis and Jackie Bolster and questioned them about the layout of the barracks. It was decided to attack the barracks on 28th September 1920. The Ahadillane Company was notified of the proposed attack and were instructed to arrange for the safe custody of any material that might be captured. The barracks were captured as planned and the arms, ammunition, together with lances, saddlery, were taken by cars on the day of the attack to a disused house on the roadside near Beeing Church. The captured material was removed that night by members of the local company to Kenny's farm at Farran, Mourne Abbey. The captured rifles were placed in barrels by the Ahadillane Coy. O/C Mick Healy, and were securely hidden away by him. As far as I can remember, the following items were captured in this raid:-

- 27 rifles
- 2 Hotchkiss Guns
- 1 Smith & Wesson Revolver
- 14000 rounds of .303 ammunition.
- A number of lances and swords, bandoliers, etc., some saddlery.

As reprisals were expected, the local company were

instructed to place a guard over the local creamery at night. An armed guard of five Volunteers was placed in the vicinity of the building for about a week but no reprisals took place in the district and the guard was withdrawn. About 20/25 members of the Ahadillane Coy. were engaged in the dumping and removal of the material captured at Mallow as well as on the guarding of the creamery and amongst them were:- Witness (Tadg McCarthy), his brother Jim, Mick Healy, Jerry Hanlon, Paddy and Ned Waters, Batt Walsh, Pat Barrett and Con Sweeney.

Early in October 1920 three lorries of British military arrived at Murphy's farm at Beeing where threshing operations were in progress. They opened fire with machine guns on the haggard where the men were working. The workers took cover and left the haggard, but an officer and some of the military rushed into the fields where they found some men sheltering behind a fence. The officer fired point-blank at one of the men (Tom Walsh) smashing his shoulder. About 4 or 5 of the men were arrested and were later interned in Ballykinlar till December 1921. The same party of military also arrested the manager of the local creamery who was also interned. All the men arrested were volunteers.

About this time (14. 10. 1920) the remains of Liam O'Connell, Lackendarra, Lombardstown, who was killed in an attack on an armoured car in Dublin, were brought to his native parish (Glantane) for burial. The British Military escorted the funeral to the village of Glantane, but did not approach the graveyard. The Brigade column, which was in the vicinity, supplied a "Firing Party" which fired three volleys over the grave.

I was appointed Battalion Engineer in November 1920. In the course of my duties I visited the companies

in the Battalion to organise engineering services, but the absence of explosives prevented any very effective work. During one of these tours I was arrested in my own Company area (Ahadillane) by a party of military who were searching for the Battalion Adjutant (Jerry Hanlon) who was employed in the local creamery (Ahadillane). I was taken to Ballincolly^{Lic} Barracks and back to Mallow, being detained for a fortnight with a number of other prisoners who had been taken in the meantime. We were all released with the exception of Liam Jones, Mourne Abbey, who was later interned.

One night at the end of December 1920, or early January 1921, three lorries of military raided Ned Waters' home at Glasabuidhe. They remained for some time and then two of the lorries with their loads of troops returned to their base at Mallow. The third lorry was hidden in the farmyard and the party of military, which arrived in it, proceeded to take over the premises and place the members of the household under arrest. They then took up positions in ambush to await the possible return home of Ned Waters who, with a number of others, had been "on the run" for some time. Ned, with his brother Paddy, Jerry Hanlon, Pad Barrett and Batt Walsh were in the vicinity but as Ned's father did not follow his usual nightly procedure of calling to his next door neighbours (Batt Walsh's house) for a chat, they became suspicious. Nearing midnight they sent Batt Walsh's sister to Ned Water's house to ascertain the position, but she did not return. They then knew that there was something wrong, so they decided to wait until daybreak. Just about this time they moved in single file towards Water's house and had actually reached the farmyard when fire was opened on them by the military. Jerry Hanlon was wounded but escaped with the others. He was later removed to hospital in Cork where a bullet was removed from his thigh.

The Battalion column was formed in January 1921. The first members were Ned Waters, Batt Walsh, Leo Callaghan, Joe Morgan, Jack Holoney (Congo), Tadg McCarthy (witness), Jer Daly, Tadg Mullane, Ned Murphy, Denis Mulcahy, Tom Callaghan, Wm. Roche, Dan McCarthy, Con Buckley and Jack Cunningham, who was Column O/C. The column was armed with 14 rifles with about 40/50 rounds of ammunition for each, while each member carried small arms as well. The members, who were not in their home areas, were billeted at Laharn in Lombardstown Company area, particularly at the house of Paddy Murphy.

About the end of January 1921 the column moved from Laharn to Glendine where they remained for a few days. They next moved to Gleannavogue in the Mourne Abbey district where they awaited reports on enemy movements. On the 14th February 1921 word was conveyed to the column that 3 lorries of Black and Tans had passed on the Glen road by Beanaskeha to Cork. The column took up position overlooking this road at Beanaskeha on the main Cork Killavullen road - about 3 miles from Killavullen, to await the return of the enemy. On the approach of darkness, at which time the enemy had not returned, a dispatch rider arrived with instructions from Battn. O/C Tadg Byrne to the Column O/C to report with the column to Mourne Abbey on the following morning before daybreak.

The column moved to the Mourne Abbey area that night and early on the morning of the 15th February 1921 took up a position on the ^{WESTERN} east side of the Mallow-Cork road opposite Leary's Rock about 5 miles from Mallow. The members of the Burnfoot ^R Company were in position overlooking the site of the ambush on the ^{EASTERN} west side of the road. Some members of this unit were responsible for blocking the road by pushing a cart into the path of the car or cars carrying General Strickland and his escort which was the party to be

ambushed. I think it should be pointed out that when the column were taking up their positions on the morning in question lights were noticed in the farmhouse of Joe Corry, Moonap^Rarson, Mourne Abbey. The officer in charge of the Burnfo^Rst Coy. (Tadg Looney) was instructed to investigate the position and it was found that Corry was preparing to go to a fair in Donoughmore. He was, however, placed under arrest and did not leave his home during the course of the subsequent engagement. (It is essential to point out the latter fact as it was rumoured in later years that Corry disclosed information concerning the ambush to the enemy). There was no change in the position until about 11 a.m. when I noticed the scouts at Mourne Abbey Castle moving away from their position in which they could be seen from the main road. I next heard firing on the opposite side of the road and to the rear of the party of the Burnfo^Rst Company overlooking the ambush position. When we looked in the direction of the firing I saw about 30/40 soldiers walking aimlessly round a field and firing shots. The column O/C then ordered us to retire from our position and using the limited cover available we withdrew in the direction of Moonap^Rarson Cross without coming under enemy fire. At this stage our scouts reported that there was a large force of military deployed over the district and it was only our local knowledge of the area that enabled the column to escape.

The men of the Burnfo^Rst Company who retreated from the ambush position towards their home district ran into various parties of military and were fired on indiscriminately. Four Volunteers were killed; two were wounded and a number of prisoners were taken. One of the wounded men died of his wounds (Mick Looney), while the other wounded man (Sonny Mulcahy), together with one

of the prisoners who had been captured while in possession of arms (Patk. Ronayne), were tried by drumhead court-martial and executed in the Detention Barracks in Cork.

In connection with the above operation I think it only fair to mention the action of Miss Siobhán Crbedon, a member of the Cumann na mBan in Mallow. During the morning of the 15th February 1921 she noticed unusual activity in the military and police circles. She contacted the Mallow Company I.O. (Danny McDonnell) and advised him of the position. He then obtained a bicycle and cycled to Mourne Abbey where he succeeded in making contact with the column just as it was about to withdraw from its position. He remained with the column until it had reached safe billets in Ahadillane and Dromahane Company areas.

Following this engagement the Brigade O/C (Liam Lynch), whose Headquarters was in Nadd at the time, held an investigation into the incident. I was present at this enquiry as were Tadg Looney, Ned Murphy, Tadg Byrne, and a number of others who had taken part in the engagement. The general feeling of those present was that there was a leakage of information but the source by which the information was revealed was not established.

About the end of February 1921 the Brigade O/C (Liam Lynch) decided to combine the Mallow and Kanturk Battalion columns, and both columns went into training at Nadd. The training was in the form of scouting and skirmishing exercises. No musketry practice took place as ammunition was too scarce. At this time the Brigade H.Q. was in Paddy McCarthy's house at Nadd - this necessitated special guard duty for members of the columns and amongst the precautions taken was the placing of two local Volunteers with two members of the column on duty

at Nadd Cross between 12 midnight and 8 a.m. each night. From nightfall to 12 midnight similar procedure was followed in addition to normal scouting duties during daylight.

On the morning of the 10th March 1921 I was on guard with a member of the column named Walsh from Ballyclough and two locals, viz. Dan Scanlan and Dick Dunne. The morning was wet and foggy and the three others went into a shed in Brides Yard at Nadd from the rain about 7.45 a.m. I remained on duty at the crossroads and just got a glimpse of two lorries of military as they appeared round a turn about 150 yds. from me. I think it was then about 8.30 a.m. I rushed into the yard and shouted to the others that the military were there. I then made my way followed by the other member of the column (Walsh) to Brigade H.Q. when I reached H.Q. word had already been received of the position from a labourer employed by McCarthys who saw the military stopping at the Cross just as he was about to enter the farmyard. I overtook Liam Lynch and his party (Geo. Power and Mossie Walsh) at the back of McCarthy's house. Accompanied by Paddy McCarthy's sons (Charlie and Seán), who were taking along Liam Lynch's typewriter and papers, we proceeded to withdraw towards Kilcorney. When we had gone about 3 fields from McCarthy's house we dumped the typewriter and immediately afterwards Liam Lynch fired one shot. (I do not know why, unless it was to notify our own troops of our position). Charlie McCarthy was then instructed to go forward and try to find out what was happening at the "Barrack" (Dave Herlihy's house where a number of the column members usually slept). Charlie returned in a short time and reported that military were lining the boundary fence close to the "Barrack".

We then changed the direction of our withdrawal and I moved on ahead to scout the position in the direction of Crinnaloo Company area. It was very foggy in patches at the time but, during a momentary break in the fog patch, I saw a man whom I did not recognise for some time, walking towards me. When he came closer I discovered that it was Joe Horgan (a member of the Column), partly dressed and suffering from wounds. I told him that Liam Lynch and the Brigade Staff were following and I continued on. A short distance further on another man appeared and he was John Ring (Ballyclough Company). He was armed with a rifle.

Liam Lynch interviewed both men and we then proceeded towards Horgan's, Crinnaloo where some badly needed food was obtained. I dried my clothes on me that day. We remained at Horgan's till evening as Liam had sent one of the Horgan family out to find what he could about the general lay-out. Horgan returned with news that Jack Moloney ("Congo") had been seriously wounded and was at Cahill's farmhouse about 1½ miles away. We immediately proceeded to Cahill's where Liam Lynch dressed "Congo's" wounds, and Dr. Ryan, Glantane was sent for. When the doctor arrived later, he again dressed Congo's wounds and stated that he would arrange to have him removed to hospital next day.

Liam Lynch and his staff left that night for Lombardstown area. Together with other members of the Column, I moved to Old Kilcórney that night. Next morning I was sent to round up the members of the Column that had escaped. (I do not remember who gave the order.) I travelled across the country from Kilcorney to my own Battalion area - I was accompanied part of the way by Martin McGrath of the Kanturk Battalion. When I reached

my home (Gurrane's, Lombardstown) I found a number of the Column already there, while more arrived later. They were all anxious to know what had occurred at Nadd as many of them had been isolated and had only escaped with the greatest difficulty. The members of the Column now returned with me to Kilcorney where we arrived about 7 p.m. on the 11th March, 1921. At this time the vast majority had been moving practically all the time since the attack opened in Nadd at about 8 a.m. on the previous day. We remained in the Kilcorney district for about a week until orders were received from Brigade Headquarters that all members of the Column should return to their own Battalion areas.

The Brigade H.Q. was now in Mallow Battalion area as occasion demanded at either Myles McCarthy's, Creggan, "Miah" Keefe's, Ballybought, William O'Callaghan's, Scarragh, or Roche's, Gortmore. In view of the increased large scale activity of the enemy, it was essential that all approaches to this district should be held. With this end in view, special steps were taken to ensure that all roads were trenched, bridges demolished and all enemy lines of communication cut. This work necessitated the constant attention each night of the members of the local Companies as well as members of the Column who acted as armed guards while the work of demolition and trenching was in progress.

About the end of March, 1921, I was appointed Adjutant of Mallow Battalion. Accompanied by Battalion O/C Tadg Byrne, I was continuously on the move about the area. At this time we arranged to have the mails in each Company area seized and censored on at least two occasions during the month of April. Nothing of any military value was disclosed. The Battalion V/C was Jeremiah Daly, and

Quartermaster Mick Nagle, Knockbrack, Burnfo^Rst. From this time till the Truce, with the exception of the operations specifically mentioned later on, I was mainly engaged at Battalion Headquarters on administrative work. Several General Orders were issued in this period, and my duties as Adjutant entailed the preparation and transmission of copies of these orders to the different Companies in the Battalion. In addition, many of these orders necessitated the preparation of individual instructions for the various areas. The Battalion Headquarters at this time was in Dan Leary's, Gortanellig, Burnfo^Rst, in the Burnfo^Rst Company area.

Early in April, 1921, the bridges over the Clydagh river on the Glantane-Mallow and Beeing-Mallow roads were demolished by the members of the Lombardstown-Kilshannig and Ahadillane Companies. These operations were carried out under the direction of Jerry Hanlon, Jack Cunningham and Ned Murphy. The destruction of these bridges prevented the development of a "pincers" movement by enemy forces engaged in a big round-up in the Donoughmore-Mallow area, and the Columns from these Battalions were saved from encirclement. As a result of this operation, twelve lorries of military and Black and Tans were held up on the Mallow side of Upper Clydagh, while twelve lorries and an armoured car were held up on the other side of the Lower Clydagh Bridge on the morning following this operation in early April, 1921. At this time the enemy were supposed to be combing the 6th Battalion area (Cork I Brigade) for Mrs. Lindsay who was arrested by our forces after an ambush at Dripsey. It would appear that this lady 'phoned information to the British military in Ballincollig which led to the ambush party at Dripsey being surprised.

While in the Burnfo^Rot area, about mid-day on June 15th, 1921, instructions were received from Battalion O/C to report with full equipment to Laharn Cross in Lombardstown Company area as soon as possible and to take with me Denis Mulcahy - a member of the Battalion Column from Burnfo^Rot. We immediately proceeded to the appointed venue where we found the other members of the Column assembled, awaiting transport to proceed to Millstreet Battalion area. Amongst those present were Jack Cunningham, O/C, Jeremiah Daly, Leo O'Callaghan, Denis Mulcahy, Tadg Mullane, Con Regan, Tom Callaghan, Batt Walshe, Con Buckley, Ned Murphy, Joe Morgan, John Moloney (Congo), Paddy Buckley, Tadg McCarthy (witness). Horses and traps were secured and the Column moved off for Millstreet area which was reached that night. We rested that night in a hay-barn at Buckley's farm at Laught (I think) after refreshments.

At daybreak on the 16th we moved into Rathcoole Wood where we met the members of the other Battalion Columns and the Brigade O/C, Paddy O'Brien. There were about 120 Column members present. About 80 of them were armed with rifles and the balance with shotguns. The whole party was divided up into sections. Six mines were laid in the road between Rathcoole and Drishanbeg, extending over a distance of about 600 yards and a section was allotted to cover off each mine. There were also parties at the extreme flanks to cover off the main body and, while all these sections were on the south side of the road, there was also a small section of four or six in position on the north side of the road. With Jeremiah Daly and Denis Murphy (O/C, Kanturk Column) I was placed on the right flank. We took up our position about 3 p.m. as did all the other sections. Sometime about an hour later the enemy (Auxiliaries) in four lorries approached the ambush position from the east (Banteer). When the leading lorry was about half a mile

from our position, the convoy halted. The Auxiliaries in this lorry dismounted and went inside the fence. Our section thought that the ambush position had been discovered and was just about to contact the O/C, but the convoy only remained stationary for about five minutes and then the party in the first lorry remounted and the four lorries moved into the ambush position. The whole convoy were lost to our view and in a few seconds we heard a mine explode. There was then heavy rifle fire from the sections on our left. This was replied to by enemy machine-guns and rifles. Grenades were also hurled at our positions by the enemy. The engagement lasted something over an hour and, as our forces were unable to silence the enemy's machine guns, the fight was broken off.

At our position on the right flank - about 350 yards from the centre of the ambush - we did not hear the signal to withdraw and it was only when we saw the section on our left moving off that we decided to move too. With the exception of the party on the north side of the road, all sections withdrew in a southerly direction to an appointed venue at the rear. It was then ascertained that we had no casualties and all Columns withdrew to their home areas. After refreshments at Moll Carthy's bridge, we proceeded into Mallow Battalion area on foot. It was afterwards learned that about twenty of the enemy were killed in this fight.

About this time instructions were issued to strike a levy at the rate of 3/- in the pound on all ratepayers - the receipts from same to be used to establish a fund to enable the army to be supplied with war material. As Adjutant I was responsible for notifying the various Companies of the amounts due to be collected in their respective areas. This involved calculation of the

individual amounts from the rate books which were supplied by the local rate collector. As far as I can recollect, the levy was collected in all the areas and the receipts were deposited with the Quartermaster.

At the end of June and early in July the Battalion Column sniped military and Black and Tan posts at Mallow on a few occasions. At this time also large parties of the enemy forces, who had been engaged in a big round-up in the mountains on the Kerry-Cork border, entered the Battalion area in the vicinity of Lombardstown. A meeting of the Battalion Council was being held at William Hegarty's, Kilcoleman, on the same night. When scouts reported that the enemy had camped in large numbers in the area, the meeting carried on until the business was concluded when all present returned to their own Company areas.

A Brigade Council meeting was called for Dromahaire on July 10th, 1921. This was attended by the Divisional O/C (Liam Lynch) who had decided that the existing Cork II Brigade was unwieldy and suggested the establishment of a new brigade - Cork IV - to include Mallow, Millstreet, Newmarket, Kanturk and Charleville Battalions. This brigade was established on 10th July, 1921, with the following officers:-

O/C	Paddy O'Brien, Lisscarrol.
Vice O/C	Ned Murphy, Lombardstown.
Adjutant	Eugene McCarthy, Charleville.
Q.M.	Mick O'Connell, Lombardstown.

The strength of the Mallow Battalion on July 11th, 1921, was about five hundred.

At the date of the Truce I was Adjutant, Mallow Battalion.

Following the Truce we established Battalion Headquarters in a disused house at Laharn, Lombardstown. With the other Battalion officers I was engaged in organisational activities for some weeks and at the end of the summer I went to a Brigade Training Camp at Knocknagree. The Camp was in charge of Paddy Kurphy, Tullylease. The training covered all aspects of military engineering, including the making of explosives, the care and handling of all available types of arms, including special classes on Hotchkiss and Lewis guns under Dick Willis, Jackie Bolster and Seán Healy. During my stay of two weeks in this camp it was visited by Rory O'Connor, Director of Engineering, I.R.A.

On completion of my course at the Camp, I returned to my Battalion where I helped to start an engineering class in a Battalion Camp at Two-pot-house. In addition I carried on my duties as Battalion Adjutant, on which I was occupied full time.

About the end of August, 1921, a Battalion review was held at Dromahaire by Seán Moylan. On the occasion numbers of the public were present and it was noticed that two strange civilians were taking photographs of the Volunteers. When this was reported to the O/C of the Parade (Tadg Byrne), he ordered the detention of the people involved. When they were questioned, it transpired that they were two Englishmen (Black and Tans) from Mallow Barracks. They were arrested, placed under guard and their cameras were taken away. They were later removed to an "unknown destination". When their arrest came to the notice of the British, two lorries of their fellows came to Dromahaire to search for them but they returned empty-handed. The matter was then reported to the Liaison Officer and, after some discussion, they were released

within a few days.

Arising out of the above incident, one of our I.O's reported that a communication had been passed to the "Officer, Mallow Military Barracks", giving details of the arrest and places of detention of the two prisoners. This information was sent by "No. 80". A copy of this communication, which is held by witness, is as follows:-

"Dear Officer,

"No. 80"

I have a little knowledge about those prisoners & black & tans, they were arrested in Dromahaire, got tea in the schoolroom. they were marched a few fields away & 2 cars commandeered one horse and trap & another common cart & was taken to Tom Barrett's house Rock (near Shanavoher river) where they were kept until Tuesday. They were to be tried for taking snapshots of Volunteers.

Those boys named that carried them were Denis Curtain, Kilpadder, Tim Barret, Leix, Pad Barrett, Leix, brothers.

Cremin, Ballysimon

O/C Pad Callaghan

Tim Sullivan, Nursetown.

Those cars that carried was not to be blamed nor the house they were kept because they should at the point of gun. It was talked about removing to Humphrey O'Leary's, Gloundine.

Officer Mallow Military
Barracks."

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

ABSTRACTION OF PART(S) PURSUANT TO REGULATION 8

Form to be completed and inserted in the original record

in place of each part abstracted

(i) Reference number of the separate cover under which the abstracted part has been filed: WS 965/A

(ii) How many documents have been abstracted: 1 p.

(iii) The date of each such document: 29 June 1954

(iv) The description of each document:
WS 965 Witness Statement Tony McCarty. p21.
name of individual

(Where appropriate, a composite description may be entered in respect of two or more related documents).

(v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention:

(c) Would or might cause distress or danger to living persons on the ground that they contain information about individuals, or would or might be likely to lead to an action for damages for defamation.

(These will be the reasons given on the certificate under Section 8(4).)

J. Moloney

Name: (J. Moloney.)

Grade: Col.

Department/Office/Court:

Date: 7 March 2003.

Several raids were made by us on suspected houses at that time in an endeavour to get a clue to the writer, but in vain. However, the identity of No. 80 has since been established. He was an ex British soldier and he later enlisted in the Free State Army in _____ and was appointed _____ His name was _____

When Mallow Military Barracks was taken over from the British in January, 1922, Battalion Headquarters was transferred there and later to the Black and Tan Barracks at Broadview on evacuation. We remained in occupation of this post until August, 1922, when we had to take to the hills again in defence of the Republic.

From August, 1922, to the Cease Fire in May, 1923, I took part in numerous engagements against Free State forces all over the Brigade area. I was arrested in July, 1923. I was taken to Macroom Castle and later to Cork Prison where I was detained until October, 1923, when I was released after a hunger strike.

I was Battalion Adjutant, Mallow Battalion, on July 1st, 1922. The strength of the Battalion was then about six hundred.


The following appendices are attached:-

1. G.H.Q. Training Memo. No. 3, 1921 - Attacks on Fortified Posts.
2. G.H.Q. Training Memo. No. 4, 1921 - Orders and Reports.

3. G.H.Q. Training Memo. No. 5, 1921 - The Revolver.
4. G.H.Q. Training Memo. No. 7, 1921 - Scouting.
5. G.H.Q. Training Memo. No. 8, 1921 - Duties of a
Company Commander.
6. G.H.Q. Training Memo. No. 9, 1921 - The Appreciation
of a Situation.
7. G.H.Q. Training Memo. No.10, 1921 - Night Operations.
8. G.H.Q. Training Memo. No.11, 1921 - Protection.
9. G.H.Q. Training Memo. No.12, 1921 - Signalling
Memo No.1.
10. G.H.Q. Training Memo. No.13, 1921 - Elementary
Scouting.
11. G.H.Q. Training Memo No. 14, 1921 - Team Drill for
Thompson Machine
Gun Crew.

SIGNED: Tadg McCarthy

DATE: 29th June 1954.



WITNESS: Phil O'Donnell

ÓGLAIS NA héIREANN.

ARD-OIFIG, ATH-CLIAITH.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, DUBLIN.

TRAINING MEMO. No. 3.
1921.

ATTACKS ON FORTIFIED POSTS.

1. It is becoming increasingly clear that training in Siege operations will be necessary for all units. This will require to be combined with Night training. The Enemy is coming to trust very confidently in his fortified posts, and it will become necessary to carry these by storm, for which very careful training is required. This matter has been a serious stumbling-block in all former Irish Wars.

2. The material gain of a successful attack is very great, and the moral gain is enormous. It is not very important what post is attacked, or when. The great thing is, to have every attack which is made, successful. Consequently, the first consideration is to select for attack the post which offers most facilities for a successful attack, not necessarily the line of least resistance.

3. The day of the comparatively haphazard attack on a Police Barrack is over, and this must be clearly realised. Only the most complete and accurate information and reconnaissance is now of any use. It is necessary to know (a) the structure of the post, the approaches to it, the points commanding it and those commanded from it. (b) The nature and strength of the Defences, the strength of the Garrison and its morale. (c) The routine of the post, the Action Stations of the Garrison, and everything of that kind—distances of possible reinforcements and their routes.

4. The required information may be obtained in various ways, and the sum total of information obtained should be sifted carefully. One source is personal observation, sometimes inaccurate; it should be checked by good sketches or photographs. Often photographs can be obtained of the post in former times and known alterations can then be recorded, or a rough sketch can be made from a distance and scouts sent to get clear on special details. Large-scale maps should be used to record accurately the ground plan and adjoining areas, exact ranges, etc. Filling-in of additional defences, *i.e.*, entanglements, etc., is easy.

5. A number of maps and accurate drawings should then be prepared in order to familiarise every Officer with the details of the post. The plan of attack should then be decided on and an estimate formed of the men and material required. The condition of material to be used should be ascertained. It should be rendered impossible to have any hitch occur in these details. Every arrangement that can possibly be expected to improve the chance of success must be made.

6. Reconnaissance should be continuous. Scouts with glasses should be maintained on dominating points, wherever possible, to keep the post under observation. Much may be learnt in this way about Enemy routine, etc. The post should especially be constantly scouted after nightfall.

7. Attacks should be rehearsed as fully as possible. They can easily be worked out on the map, and some building similar to that to be attacked should be made the object of sham attacks both by day and night. In this way such matters as not crossing the line of advance of neighbouring parties, as keeping in touch with adjoining Units, and providing for bringing up stores from the rear, etc., all these, in which any carelessness might easily cause a hitch, are brought home to the men. In the World War, the Germans (even) constructed models of the French positions before their big attacks at Verdun.

THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING.

MAY, 1921.

ORDERS AND REPORTS.

Orders and Reports are always mentioned together, because they present two different views of one Operation. The Order is the Operation as we hope and intend to carry it out. The Report is the Operation as it actually has been carried out. We order the same thing as we hope to be able to report later on: we report something as near to what we ordered as we were able to accomplish.

Since the Order and the Report deal with the same Operation it is essential to have a Regular Form the general lines of which will serve for both. A Regular Form of this description has the following advantages: (1) It ensures careful planning; (2) It gives the Higher Command clear ideas; (3) It helps Training by making criticism easy. Let us examine these in detail.

(1) This applies more to the Order than to the Report. The Form ensures careful planning because the Officer responsible for the Order is bound to something definite. He must draw up the Order paragraph by paragraph, and be exact in each paragraph. This makes him think over everything carefully and prevents him adopting any hare-brained schemes. At the same time this care in planning is the surest way of guaranteeing successful handling of the Operation.

(2) This applies rather to the Report than to the Order. When once an Operation has been carried out the Higher Command has no time to do more than deal with the essentials of it. For this reason a Regular Form containing only these essentials is required. In this way it is a great saving of time and labour.

(3) Nothing helps Training so much as clearness. A clear definite Order or Report gives at one glance the salient points. When reviewing the Operation in the light of the Order and Report about it clearness and exactness of form shows what to discuss and emphasise. In this way those receiving the Instruction have impressed on them the vital points without any fear of being confused by superfluous matters.

Neither Orders nor Reports should be wooden or inflexible in form. But both must follow a clear and definite line of thinking. There is a certain order of ideas to be observed in dealing with military operations both before and after they happen. In the Order and in the Report each one of these ideas requires a separate and distinct paragraph to itself. The following table gives side by side the corresponding sections for an Order and a Report:

ORDER.

- (1) Objective.
- (2) Information about Enemy.
- (3) Information about Own Force.
- (4) Disposal of Force and Plan of Action.
- (5) Detailed Orders for Units.
- (6) Formal Instructions.

REPORT.

- (1) Objective.
- (2) Information about Enemy.
- (3) Information about Own Force.
- (4) Disposal of Force and Plan of Action.
- (5) How Action developed.
- (6) Detailed development in case of Special Units.
- (7) Results: Casualties, etc.
- (8) Deductions.

OVER

We shall analyse these divisions in detail and consider their relations with one another, and also the relations of the corresponding sections of the Order and Report.

Evidently the first thing to consider with reference to any Operation is **THE OBJECTIVE**; because unless it has a definite military aim or Objective it does not deserve to be called an Operation at all; to attack a Barrack, to ambush a convoy, to destroy a bridge—whatever it is that we set out to do—these are the matters to be set out first of all.

The next thing to set out in the natural course of events is the **INFORMATION AVAILABLE ABOUT THE ENEMY**. It may be said that Information about the Enemy is part of the Objective, indeed. For example nobody would plan an attack on a post without reasonable knowledge of the garrison holding it. In our case it is particularly important to emphasise this matter. Time and again our parties go out "on speck," lying in wait for an enemy that never comes. The time thus spent could be better spent in Training. Information about the Enemy leads to the question of suitable methods of action. A party of 20 in two Crossleys presents a different problem from 20 on bicycles, and so on.

So much for the Objective and the means in the Enemy's power to prevent our attaining it. The next factor in logical order is **OUR OWN MEANS OF ATTAINING IT**, or in other words, particulars about our Own Forces. What forces are at our disposal, what number of these are necessary, how are they equipped—these are things we must be clear about. It is particularly important to be accurate as to the material required. Miscalculation or no calculation at all as to questions involving materials of various kinds is a common failing of inexperienced Commands.

Having secured clearness regarding the end to be attained and the means available to attain it, the next consideration is **METHOD OF EMPLOYING THOSE MEANS**. This includes such matters as the Disposal of our troops, the Plan of Action projected, Protective Measures, etc. It is here that absolute clearness is essential, both in preparing the Plan, framing the Order, and making the Report. The last to facilitate reference and criticism. Up to this point it will be observed there is no outstanding distinction made between the Order and the Report; but from this point on the two will follow distinct courses.

In the foregoing table part 5 of the Order refers to Detailed Orders for Units. For the purpose of clearness it is necessary to have separate paragraphs or sub-paragraphs for each body of troops engaged. Thus in a Brigade Operation Order each Battalion would have a paragraph to itself, in a Battalion Operation Order each Company would have one. Special Units such as First Aid, Engineers, Transport, etc., also have separate paragraphs.

No. 5 in the Report—How the Action Developed should be a simple, concise and soldierly statement of what actually happened; no attempt must be made to exaggerate success or conceal failure. Accuracy is essential: accuracy as to time especially is always of enormous use with a view to improving later operations. Accuracy as to casualties—both our own and the Enemy's is also required. They help to indicate the value of various types of Operation. Still more important is the record of ammunition expended: accuracy in this respect is the most effective way to prepare sound principles of Fire Control. Deductions are valuable to impress the Military lessons contained in the Report; if necessary they should refer back to earlier paragraphs in order to drive home the lessons more forcibly.

With regard to all questions of fact, absolute accuracy must be insisted on: Time, Place, Map Reference, Designation of Officers, in every one of these all possibility of error must be done away with. In these dead accuracy is obtainable and in these at least we must make the most of it.

Skeleton forms of an Operation Order and an Operation Report are appended.

By Order,

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING.

Operation Order No.

(Here insert 1, 2, 3, etc., as the case may be).

Headquarters

(Printed Capitals if a PLACE NAME).

Refer to Map

(Here insert Map used, Sheet No., etc.)

Date

(If a Night give the two days it comes between).

To :

Here insert the Officer's Rank and Unit:

Name is not the proper thing because he may be
killed meantime or superseded).

Leave a good wide margin for
sake of clearness and notes,
etc.

1. (Objective: to attack an Enemy Post, to occupy a Position in Readiness, to cut roads in an Area, etc.).
2. (Information about Enemy: Strength, Movements, Special Equipment if any, etc.).
3. (Information about Own Force: Units engaged in Operation; Other Section having a bearing on Operation, etc.):
4. (Disposal of Force and Plan of Action: a clear general statement of situation).
5. (a) Orders to A Coy. :
(b) Orders to B Coy. :
(c) Orders to Engineers.
(d) Orders to Cyclists.
6. (a) Reports to be sent to me (State exact spot, BALLYHALE POST OFFICE not BALLYHALE simply).
(b) Acknowledge (if this is required).

By :

(Here insert method of forwarding: by Orderly
to Officer in Person, etc.).

Signed _____

Time (To be set out exactly).

Operation Report
(Number as in Order).

PLACE SENT FROM.

Refer to Map
(As in Order).

Date.

To:

(Here designate Superior by Rank and Unit).
Leave Margin as in Order.

1. (Objective—as set out. Par 1. will, when the Operation follows an Order, acknowledge an Order and the rest will follow in series).
2. Information about Enemy—giving any further details having a bearing on the situation.
3. (Information about Own Forces—giving further information similarly).
4. (Disposal of Force and Plan of Action—as set about to be attempted).
5. (How Action developed—a clear Narrative).
6. (a) (Separate Action of Covering Troops, etc. For each separate Action a separate paragraph is necessary).
(b)
(c)
7. (Results, Enemy Casualties—Our Casualties—ammunition expended, captured, or lost, etc.).
8. (Deductions—Own Troops, Enemy, Material, Ground, Weapons, etc.).
9. (Am moving on to—as the case may be. Extra paragraph if necessary).

By:

(Insert method of forwarding).

Signed _____

Time (Exact).

THE REVOLVER.

It must be clearly understood that the revolver is a short range weapon, effective up to 75 yards. The steadying influences of the use of both hands and the shoulder rest, as with the rifle are lacking, and it is therefore absolutely necessary that the recruit becomes familiar with certain principles before he can shoot accurately with the revolver.

The cleaning and oiling of the weapon have an important bearing upon its accuracy. When an action is over, or as soon after as possible, the "piece" should be thoroughly cleaned and oiled, this will reduce labour and eliminate the possibility of the weapon becoming "pitted," that is the formation of rust in the barrel, or tiny holes which will eventually mar its accuracy.

In LOADING the cartridges should be firmly pressed down in the chambers of the cylinders so that the rims of the cartridges will not strike the frame when the cylinder is in position. The hammer should then be partially cocked so as to enable the operator to spin the cylinder, thereby making sure that the cartridges will clear the frame.

"DOUBLE ACTION" should never be used. By double action is meant the cocking of the hammer by squeezing on the trigger until the hammer is mechanically cocked and fired. This entails a pressure of approximately 15 pounds as against 5 when the hammer is already cocked. The extra muscular effort used in double action deranges the aim, and when it is considered that a derangement of the barrel of $\frac{1}{8}$ of an inch at a target 25 yards away will mean a miss of at least 8 inches, much of the poor shooting and missing is accounted for.

In firing never pull or snap the trigger. The hammer should first be cocked with the thumb of the right hand, and then the trigger carefully squeezed with the forefinger of the firing hand. An even, steady squeeze on the trigger, the operator at the same time endeavouring to better his aim will invariably lead to good results.

The revolver should be held firmly but never with too tight a grip. If grasped too tight a certain tension of the arm muscles will result, which will be transmitted in the form of vibration thus deranging the aim.

A good aim is the correct alignment of three things:—the rear sight, the fore sight, and the target. This alignment is commonly called the "line of sight."

The cocking of the hammer, the aiming and sighting, and the careful squeezing of the trigger, *without the use of ammunition should* be practised as often as possible. This will familiarise the operator with the proper manipulation of the weapon and also rapidly improve his aiming when in action. This practice is absolutely essential and can be successfully carried out in any room or place of concealment, a circular object *not larger than a sixpence* should be used as an aiming mark or target.

Remember that one man shooting accurately will cause more havoc and confusion among the enemy than forty men shooting and taking "pot" shots and uselessly expending ammunition.

OGLAIGH NA hÉIREANN.

TRAINING MEMO. No. 7.

SCOUTING.—2.

EYE FOR GROUND.

WHERE TO GO.

The scout should choose some good point of view having a covered approach and a second line of escape; the danger of trees, towers and easily marked points should be borne in mind.

HOW TO GO.

The object of the mission must be kept in view, and a definite plan made. Vantage points should be selected as stepping stones to the ultimate point chosen, and careful observation made before each advance. The route selected should, as far as possible, lie along dead ground, hollows, bushes, rocks, hedges, woods and shadows.

The skyline or a bad background should be avoided, and care taken not to alarm animals or birds "en route." If held up the scout should try elsewhere; boldness may be necessary to deceive the enemy. If exposed he should either move quickly or hide by keeping perfectly flat and still; if under cover he should go steadily. Training in stalking and crawling is essential.

HOW TO RETURN.

The good scout, on his way out, will note the direction, the wind, and appearance of landmarks from both sides to help his return. He will be prepared to return by a different route.

He should do the unexpected. He should cover up his tracks. If seen, he should keep cool, pretend not to know he is seen, and instantly form some plan of offence or escape. The advantage of night darkness, dawn or evening light, fog or mist, for approach or return, should be remembered. Practise in listening and silence are essential by day and night.

EYE FOR DISTANCES, SIZE, AND NUMBERS

Various methods of ranging by eye are:—

- (a) *Unit of Measure*.—Measuring by some familiar unit, such as 100 yards. This is accurate up to 400 yards when the intervening ground is visible.
- (b) *Key Range*.—The range of one object having been ascertained, it is compared with other ranges.
- (c) *Bracketing*.—The possible maximum and minimum ranges are estimated and the mean taken.
- (d) *Appearance*.—Judging by apparent size and visibility of a man, or other object of known size.
- (e) *Averaging*.—Adding together a number of estimates (excluding any obviously wrong), and dividing the total by the number of estimates.
- (f) *Doubling*.—Judging the distances halfway and doubling it. When possible a range-finder should be used to correct or confirm estimates; this gives the men confidence, and they learn their tendency either to cover or under-estimate distances. Practices should be carried out as competitions.

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING,
G.H.Q.,

July, 1921.

OGLAIGH NA hEIREANN.

DUTIES OF A COMPANY COMMANDER.

Company Commanders should endeavour to develop powers of command in their subordinates.

With this object in view they should rarely interfere in the affairs of a section except through its Commander.

A Coy. Commander who tries to command every man in his company will soon find that his section officers and junior officers are losing all powers of leading and enforcing discipline. For example a Batt. Commander who notices that a man in one of his sections is making a mistake, should call the attention of its Coy. Commander to the matter. The latter will then point out the mistake to the Section Commander, and will see that he corrects the individual man.

This principle of command develops a sense of responsibility in subordinate officers and teaches them to exercise command.

DUTIES IN ATTACK.

The orders which the Coy. Commander will issue before advancing to the attack will be based primarily on those received from the Batt. Commander, and secondly on the reports of the scouts, on his personal reconnaissance of the ground, and his knowledge of the situation.

Throughout an action the Coy. Commander will keep in touch with his Platoon Commanders, with his Battalion Commander and with the Company Commanders on his flanks.

(2) SUPPORTS.—The Company Commander should, as a rule, divide the company into firing line and supports, and, if the company is operating alone, a reserve should be kept in hand as long as circumstances permit.

(3) ORDERS TO SECTION COMMANDERS.—In formulating his orders the Company Commander should indicate generally the task, objective and direction of each section. If more than one section is detailed for the initial firing line he should allot a definite objective to each. He must arrange for the replenishment of ammunition. He should inform his officers of the place to which reports are to be sent, and of his own position during the operation.

DUTIES OF SECTION COMMANDERS.

The duty of the Section Commander is to lead his section. He must see that the direction is maintained and that he does not mask the fire of his neighbouring sections. He must select and point out the successive halting places of his section and must regulate the number of men to occupy particular portions of cover. Taking care not, on any account to allow men to "bunch" or crowd together.

He must control and direct the fire of his section, he must pass on quickly all reports that come to him.

DUTIES OF COMPANY COMMANDER IN DEFENCE.

A Coy. Commander's duties in defence are much the same in attack. He must, however, also arrange for the occupation and preparation of the ground allotted to him for the best and most advantageous defence.

Subordinate and section officers, in addition to the general duties already described, must see:—

- (1). That every man can use his rifle (or weapon) effectively.
- (2). That the cover is adequate.
- (3). That the positions are concealed from the enemy.
- (4). That ranges are taken and communicated to the men.
- (5). That he has ample supplies of ammunition and water, etc.

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING, G.H.Q.

OGLAIGH NA hEIREANN.

THE APPRECIATION OF A SITUATION.

There is no better practice than this for improving military knowledge—it further produces sound reasoning.

An appreciation is nothing more or less than the putting down in black and white the course of reasoning which went on in the brain and resulted in the issue of an Operation Order.

It is, however, essential that a fixed sequence of reasoning should be pursued, this will prevent the risk of essential points being overlooked.

OUTLINE OF AN APPRECIATION.

- (1). Clear and concise statement of the object in view.
- (2). Situation and strength of friendly and hostile forces:—
 - (a). Relative strengths and possible reinforcements.
 - (b). Distribution and topography.
 - (c). Armaments.
 - (d). Morale and influence on politics.
 - (e). Points which can be reached by yourself and by the enemy in a given time.
- (2). Positions and the advantages and disadvantages they offer to yourself and the enemy.
 - (f). Lines of communication.
 - (g). Transport and supplies.
- (3). Courses open to yourself and to the enemy (always give the enemy credit for acting soundly).
 - (a). Enemy's probable objective.
 - (b). Who will probably secure the initiative?
 - (c). Discuss various plans of campaign open to yourself and to the enemy.
 - (d). What action of the enemies would most hamper your movements?
 - (e). How can this action be met by you?
 - (f). What time is available?
- (4). What is the best course for you to take **considering** all these circumstances?
- (5). How do you propose to put it into action?

MAP.

- Having appreciated the situation you start to write out your Operation Orders
- (1). All proper names in BLOCK Capitals.
 - (2). Avoid abstruse possibilities "if possible," "if time allows," etc.
 - (3). Give Subordinate Officers a free hand—leave it to them to devise the means.
 - (4). Avoid drawing attention to precautions **which will be taken**.
 - (5). Never issue orders as to the course to pursue if defeated. Remember a **successful retreat** is better than a **poor advance**.

FIELD MESSAGES.

- (1). Confine yourself to "facts," don't enter into questions or "I believe" or "I think."
- (2). State the facts clearly, and, if necessary, quote your authority for them.
- (3). Don't give your opinion until asked for it.
- (4). Don't use superlatives; words like "very" and "extremely" lose their force when used frequently.
- (5). Number your paragraphs; this will help you in writing and it will help the recipient in answering.

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING, G.H.Q.

OGLAIGH NA HEIREANN.

NIGHT OPERATIONS.

Night Operations are undertaken to:—

- (1). Outmanoeuvre an enemy.
- (2). To pass over ground impossible by day.
- (3). To complete an attack begun by day.
- (4). To effect a tactical surprise.

ESSENTIALS TO SUCCESS:—

- (1). Simplicity.
- (2). Surprise.
- (3). Secrecy.
- (4). Perfect preliminary reconnaissance.
- (5). Ample preparation and time.
- (6). Maintenance of Communications

THE RECONNAISSANCE:—

- (1). Examine the route by day and night.
- (2). Ascertain the best method of protecting the column, and all points where checks are likely to be noted.
- (3). Cross roads should be marked
- (4). Compass direction taken.
- (5). Destination described.
- (6). Position of his outposts.
- (7). Position of his entrenchments.
- (8). Position of obstacles

RULES FOR NIGHT MARCHES.

Night marches are of two kinds. Strategic and Tactical.

- (1). Procure local guides.
- (2). Withdraw outposts last.
- (3). Issue orders late.
- (4). Maintain silence.
- (5). Inform all ranks what to do in case of an alarm.
- (6). Starting points should be marked.
- (7). Arms should be charged but *not* loaded.
- (8). No smoking should be allowed.

NIGHT ADVANCES.

The object is to gain ground under cover of darkness.

- (1). Used as a preliminary to opening an attack.
- (2). To continue an engagement already begun.

NIGHT ATTACKS.

The object is to secure important points on an outpost line; or to seize definite positions under cover of darkness.

PREPARATIONS FOR NIGHT ADVANCES AND ATTACKS:—

- SELECT: 1. Position of Assembly.
2. Position of Deployment.

Decide upon a definite formation—(a formation adaptable to all circumstances is—a line of sniper-scouts a line of attack—supports.

THE ADVANCE. Before advancing explain:

- (1). Orders to all ranks.
- (2). Object in view and its direction.
- (3). Formation to be adopted at position of deployment.
- (4). The part each man has to play.
- (5). Action in case enemy is not surprised.

THE ATTACK.

The firing line delivers the assault:

The supports reinforce the assault at any point at which it is held up.

N.B.—The bayonet is the most effective, and demoralising weapon to the defenders.

DEFENCE BY NIGHT—

If enemy expected to attack by night—the firing line should be strengthened.

Advanced posts will throw the attackers formation into confusion.

Fire must be used freely in order to hold off and prevent assault.

Obstacles should be placed in order to break up attackers formation.

Searchlights assist defenders.

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING, G.H.Q.

OGLAIGH NA HEIREANN.

PROTECTION.—I.

When a small unit, like a single company is moving by itself, half a dozen scouts thrown out in front and in rear will generally be sufficient protection. On very open ground, such as the Midlands the scouts should be at least 200 yards apart and 800 yards in front so that they may discover any enemy who may be lying in ambush before the company comes within decisive range. It is also advisable that the company should march in open formation, so that, if fire is opened unexpectedly, it will not offer a very vulnerable target. In close country the scouts must keep near enough to maintain connection with the company, so that the Captain can pass orders to them when necessary; but they must be sufficiently far forward to discover any ambush before the company comes under fire.

In ordinary agricultural country, most common to us here, the scouts must "make good" any position which the enemy might be occupying before the company comes into view of it. A junior officer should be sent forward with about a dozen scouts; he should send a couple out in front and detail the others as required to go and reconnoitre any ridge, or wood or other position which commands the road, and where enemy might be concealed. These scouts should arrange a simple signal for "All clear" in order that the march may not be delayed.

It is obvious that this kind of work entails severe physical efforts, for the scouts may have to double some distance of the road to search points, and if they are slow the march will be delayed. The Captain should consider carefully the physical condition of the men and the work they are doing, and he may often find it advisable to relieve his scouts with fresh men.

VANGUARD.—The vanguard is responsible for reconnoitring, and it forms a rallying point for the scouts if they are driven in.

MAIN GUARD will march at a definite interval behind the vanguard and will support it. It may consist of 10 men for a company.

O.C. ADVANCED GUARD.—The vanguard and the main guard together form the advanced guard under the O.C. Advanced Guard, who if opposition is encountered will decide whether he will attack or wait for reinforcements from main body.

PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED:—

1. The **vanguards** special duty is reconnaissance, and it should be so far forward that the enemy cannot fire into the **main guard**.

2. The **main guards** must at all costs hold the enemy until the main body can form up for **attack or defence**.

3. The advanced guard as a whole must not be so weak or so far forward that the enemy can overwhelm it before the main body can assist it.

Flank Guards must be thrown out at a convenient distance on both flanks and will be responsible for flank protection.

REAR GUARDS.—When a force is advancing the rear guard consists of only a small party to pick up stragglers

When a force is retiring and the enemy is following it, the rear guard is essentially a fighting body and the main principles to be observed are:—

(1). The rear guard must make time for the main body to get away or take up a defensive position by "delaying action."

(2). The rear guard must not hold on too long in any one position or it may be cut off; and it must retain order.

The conduct of a rear guard, more than any other operation in war, depends for its success on the skill and energy of the Commander.

NOTE.—In occupying rear guard positions it is important—

(1). To show a bold front to the enemy.

(2). To make sure of good lines of retreat

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING, G.H.Q.

OGLAIGH NA hEIREANN.

SIGNALLING MEMO. No. I.

Though an armed mob may win an engagement it can never win a campaign. A fighting force is effective only if it is organised on a proper system. The difference between an army and a mob is that the organisation of the army makes co-operation between all its units for the attainment of the common objective possible. Ultimately it was such unity of command which won the military victory in the late European War.

Before an army can act effectively as a whole it must possess a complete system of Inter-communication between its component parts. Efficiency consists in doing each thing in the best way. The best way of doing a thing is that way which completely achieves the required result with the least expenditure of effort. Accordingly efficient inter communication must make use of the least wasteful methods. It is not efficient to get a message across a zone of fire by runner if it is possible to signal across it. Hence the imperative necessity for Signal Training.

In Guerilla Warfare especially the rapid transmission of complete information—positive or negative—is essential to success. To enable the C.O. to strike at the right time and place full information both of our own dispositions and movements and of those of the enemy is required, and such information is if possible even more essential to ensure the clean get away which should always be arranged for.

Of all systems of signalling the Semaphore is the simplest, and it is the only one which, for short distances, can be used when no apparatus is available. A good knowledge of the Semaphore is especially useful to scouts. Like most types of visual signalling Semaphores can be read over a very large angle of vision. Where possible the signaller should take up a position in which he cannot at all events be read from the rear. Important communications should when possible be put in cipher. The effective range for Semaphore without flags is about 600 yards. Ten words per minute is the standard rate, but it will be found possible in practice to read the signals at the quickest rate at which it is possible to send them.

Morse signals with the flag can also be intercepted over a wide angle. The question of Background is of very great importance. Signals can be read at varying distances which depend mainly on the suitability of the background and then on the state of the atmosphere. One or two miles is as much as can be expected under ordinary circumstances. A good man should read eight words per minute.

Signalling shutters of the shutter type are satisfactory over short distances only. Their advance over flag systems is that they can be operated from under cover. Signalling with the shutter will also be found slower than the flag.

Daylight signalling with the lamp requires a special type of apparatus, but any shutter or electric lamp will give good results by night. Lamp signals may be made very directive, and so comparatively secret, by exposing the flash through a tube which has been blackened on the inside. Where possible lamps should be set on the distant station by day, or the direction defined by white pickets to facilitate the subsequent opening up of communication.

In all types of Visual Signalling the points to consider are:

Obtaining Communication.

Concealment.

Backgrounds.

As regards opening communication the position selected should have a clear view to those stations with which communication is desired, as well as to those with which it is already established and with which it is likely to be required later. For this reason the highest ground should be looked for, consistent with the other essential considerations. The immediate vicinity of Camps, roads, Traffic, lights, smoke, dust and mists should be avoided as tending to hinder communication. Stations should take up positions from which they are most likely to be seen and picked up; near prominent buildings, haystacks, distinctive clumps of trees or solitary trees. They should be where they can easily be found by messengers and Orderlies.

The necessity for concealment is due to consideration for:

The secrecy of the work.

The secrecy of the dispositions of the troops

The safety of the party.

and varies more or less with the distance or proximity of the enemy. Signallers should invariably take advantages of all natural cover which may afford concealment from the enemy. In order to obtain communication it may sometimes be necessary to take up a position in the sky line, but soon as communication has been obtained a lower position should be occupied.

With respect to backgrounds the object to be kept in view is to obtain as great a contrast as possible between the signals and the background against which they will be seen. The background should be unbroken and uniform in colour. Woods, especially of Pine Trees, Ploughed fields, Rocks and dark buildings form the darkest backgrounds and skyline and water the lightest. The greater the distance between the background and the observer the lighter it will appear. The less distance between the object displayed and its background the sharper will be the contrast. It should be remembered that the background to a station is not necessarily the colour of the ground in its immediate vicinity, but may be that of the features of the country some miles behind it.

If portable telephones are available for signal purposes, and a line can be laid or an existing line used, they are more satisfactory than visual signalling on account of their secrecy. To ensure accuracy verbal messages on the 'phone must be checked back group by group as the message is being sent, and the whole message repeated by the receiver before it is finally accepted.

Telegraph instruments of the vibrator type are extremely portable, and can often be worked over faulty lines in which speech would be impossible.

In all signal work reliability, accuracy and speed can only be assured by keeping rigidly to a uniform system of procedure which must be followed in a mechanical manner. Of course without complete uniformity of method inter-communication can not exist at all.

It must be remembered that the signaller always carries a very heavy burden of individual responsibility. Many lives may be lost by his lack of nerve or lack of resource. He does not enjoy the moral support which ability to reply to the enemy with his own weapons gives to the ordinary Volunteer. He should be made to understand that, if given a message to deliver, it **MUST** be delivered at all costs, no matter how great the risk. And the value of an efficient Signaller can not be over estimated.

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING. G.H.Q.

OGLAIGH NA hEIREANN.

ELEMENTARY SCOUTING.

The Commander of any force always wants to find out and know as much as possible regarding the strength and disposition of the enemy. He also requires information about the country in which he is operating, more especially regarding roads, bridges, sites for camping, water and supplies, etc. A good deal of this information is obtained by familiarity of ground in peace time. Since war has commenced further information has been collected and filed by the general staff, from maps, secret agents, prisoners, inhabitants and reconnaissances.

"Reconnaissance reports" are usually understood to refer to movements, dispositions, etc., of the enemy. Simple "Reports" generally deal with roads, supplies, etc.

The large majority of cases affecting us, with regard to providing information, must be entrusted to our cyclist and infantry scouts. Every man should be taught the simpler duties of a scout. To observe country, watch the enemy, give clear, distinct verbal reports, etc.

Every company should also have at least six most highly trained scouts, and every officer should be trained and should continually practice himself in the art of scouting, in case special reconnaissance work is required.

Scouts must be of good physique and in hard training; they must have good sight, hearing and memory; they must have presence of mind and self-reliance.

The above mentioned qualifications should be found in a man before training, because although good training will improve these qualities it can seldom create them. In order to train scouts they should be instructed in the following:—

Scout craft, Observation, Marksmanship and Reporting are the main features, but any one of these contains a long course of training in itself, so of course I will have to select the most important items and hope to go more fully into the others on a future occasion.

OBSERVATION or Training of the Eye.

The scout should be trained to have a quick eye (i.) for the enemy, (ii.) for ground, (iii.) for estimating distances, size or numbers.

(i.) EYE FOR ENEMY. *What to look for—*

Scouts should be on the watch for movement, changes and contrasts, curious or unnatural objects, signs of the enemy in dust, smoke, tracks, the glint on or clear outline of such objects as the barrel of a rifle or a helmet. He should keep a watch on any object when once seen.

Where to look.

He should learn the habits of the enemy at various times and seasons, and constantly put himself in the enemy's place. He should search likely points such as skylines, trees, points with good views, defiles, ridges, exposed points, shadows and covers.

How to look.

He should always act as if he were watched, and try to see quickly without being seen; in doing this he should be careful not to disclose his position. The outline must be broken, likely places avoided, and the hands and face hidden. In all searching, method should be employed.

(ii.) EYE FOR GROUND. *"Where to go."*

The scout should choose some good point of view having a covered approach and second line of escape. The danger of towers, trees and easily marked points should be borne in mind.

"How to go."

The object of the mission must be kept in view, and a definite plan made.

Vantage points should be selected as stepping stones to the ultimate objective and very careful observation made before each advance.

The route selected should lie along dead ground, hollows, hedges, woods and shadows.

The skyline should be always avoided.

If exposed, he should either move quickly or hide by lying perfectly flat and still.

"How to return."

The good scout on his way out should note the direction, the wind, and appearance of landmarks from both sides to help his return. He will also be prepared to return by a different route. He should do the unexpected. If seen he should keep cool, pretend not to know he is seen, and instantly plan an offensive action or an escape.

(iii.) EYE FOR DISTANCE. SIZE AND NUMBERS.

Methods of ranging by eye are:—

- (a) "Unit of measure."—Measuring by some familiar unit, such as 100 yards. This is accurate up to 400 yards when the intervening ground is visible.
- (b) "Key Range."—The range to one object having been gained, it is compared with other ranges.
- (c) "Bracketing."—The possible maximum and minimum ranges are taken and the "mean" estimated.
- (d) "Appearance."—Judging by the size and visibility of a man, or some other object of a known size.
- (e) "Doubling."—Judging the distance half way and then doubling it.

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING, G.H.Q.

OGLAIGH NA HEIREANN.

TEAM DRILL FOR THOMPSON MACHINE GUN CREW.

The crew to consist of 6 men, and 1 N.C.O., crew to be numbered from 1 to 6:—

No. 1	Gunner.
" 2	Feeder.
" 3	Filler.
" 4	Spare Parts.
" 5 and 6	to be Observers.			

When the crew falls in for practice, No. 1 is the right hand man of the squad, and so on to the end of the line, as in Fig 1.

Fig. 1 654321.

The GUN will be placed 3 paces in front of the squad, ammunition in drums or magazines on the LEFT of the GUN.

On the command examine GUN. Nos. 1 and 2 move to the GUN; No. 1 will examine the gun, No. 2 will examine the ammunition. When Nos. 1 and 2 vacate their places in the squad, Nos. 3 and 4 will take their places and numbers, as in Fig. 2.

FIG. 2. 2.1

21

6543

6543.

When No. 1 examines the gun, and it is ready for action, he calls out GUN CLEAR (the gun must always be examined before going into action).

On the COMMAND Action RIGHT, LEFT, OR FRONT, at 400 Yds., No. 1 repeats the command as he fixes his sights, draws back the Actuator until it is engaged in the sear; turns the safety catch on, and places the DRUM in position (No. 2 having drum ready for No. 1); they move forward to the fire position (at the double) the rest of the crew taking up their positions as in Fig. 3.

FIG. 3. No. 6. No. 2. No. 1. No. 5.

No. 3.

No. 4.

When the gun is in position No. 2 looks towards the N.C.O., and on the signal to fire he taps No. 1 on the shoulder (the signal to open fire, is when the N.C.O. cuts his hand to his side). The signal to cease fire is the hand moved horizontally from right to left; the signal, out of action, is the same as the retire signal in extended order drill.

When the Gun is going out of action, Nos. 1 and 2 retire first, Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 covering their retreat. When Nos. 1 and 2 are in their new positions, Nos. 3 and 4 retire; the observers Nos. 5 and 6 to retire last.

Great care should be taken that no man crosses the line of fire.

When feeding the gun it should be fed from the LEFT side, that is, when the Gunner (No. 1) presses up the Magazine catch with the thumb of his RIGHT hand (No. 2), the Feeder, releases the empty magazine with his LEFT hand, and places the full magazine in position with his RIGHT hand; when the full magazine is in position the (No. 2) passes back the empty one to (No. 3) who is responsible for filling. Great care should be taken when filling the drums that each round is placed in properly, and that each department has its proper number of rounds (6).

NOTE:—It is necessary that each member of the crew should be able to operate the gun, and take it down, and assemble it. For this purpose it is necessary that each man should be practised on the gun, and in the other positions of Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, that is, when the crew falls in for practice as in FIG. 1, and when the gun has been examined as in FIG. 2. On the command CHANGE ROUNDS, No. 1 repeats the command, and doubles to the end of the squad, No. 2 taking his (No. 1) place on the gun, No. 3 taking his (No. 2) place, and so on to the end of the squad, as follows:—

No. 3. No. 2.
No. 2. No. 1.

1. Nos. 6, 5, 4, 3.

No. 3. No. 2.

Nos. 1, 6, 5, 4.

Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of the Gun team should be armed with Revolvers, and Numbers 4, 5, 6 with Rifles.

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING,
G.H.Q.