BUREAU OF MILIT	ARY HISTORY 1913-21
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BUREAU OF MILITARY HISTORY, 1913-21.

STATEMENT BY WITNESS

DOCUMENT NO. W.S. 300

Witness

Captain Henry S. Murray, l Eaton Square, Terenure, Dublin. Identity

Lieut. "A" Coy. 4th Batt'n. Dublin Brigade Irish Volunteers, Easter Week 1916.

Subject

(a)	Training	of	'A'	Company	1914-1916;
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(b) Howth Gun-Running 1914;

(c) Marrowbone Lane Distillery Easter Week 1916.

Conditions, if any, stipulated by Witness

Nil

File No. S.912

Form B.S.M. 2.

W.S. 300

Reference S. 912. AL

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Bureau of Military History 1913-1921.

Statement of Henry S. Murray.

Part I.

Covering the period from the establishment of the Irish Volunteers up to the release of the Irish prisoners from Frongoch Internment Camp in 1916.

Foreword.

In the following statement I have endeavoured to keep closely to facts within my personal knowledge and to refrain from introducing matters of which I had some knowledge but not sufficient to be satisfied that I had all the facts. My statement is largely concerned with strictly military activities; the viewpoint is that of a man of junior rank who was content to carry out orders given to him by superior officers in whom he had complete confidence and trust.

When I joined the Irish Volunteers I had no particular affiliations with any political party or association with any cultural or social organisation. I had always believed in my country's right to complete independence and considered that the extent to which that right could be secured depended on the amount of force that the men of the country were prepared to exert. Therefore I felt it a perfectly logical thing for me to devote my energies to the military side of the movement for national independence when the formation of the Irish Volunteers provided the opportunity. I had unbroken military service when I retired from the National Army in October, 1923 with the rank of Commandant.

Statement.

I was a member of the Irish Volunteers. I joined that organisation in January, 1914 and was posted to "A" Company, 4th Battalion, Dublin Brigade. I was 19 years of age at the time and was employed in Dublin as a commercial clerk. I held the following ranks as indicated during my membership of the Irish Volunteers.

Squad Commander	-	1914
Section Commander	- ,	1914/1915
Company Adjutant	-	1915
Second Lieutenant	- . [.]	1915
First Lieutenant	-	1916
Company Captain	-	1917
Battalion Adjutant	-	1918-1919
Battalion Training	Officer -	1920
Battalion Adjutant	_	1922
Commandant	· _ :	1923

The headquarters of "A" Company was a disused mill premises at "Larkfield", Kimmage, Dublin, the property of George Noble Count Plunkett. The premises consisted of two storeys, the upper storey being used as a drill hall and the lower storey as a miniature rifle range. Immediately adjoining these premises was a field suitable for Company and Battalion drill and other out-door military exercises.

In January, 1914, the Captain of "A" Company was Eamon Ceannt who later in that year became Commandant of the 4th Battalion and was executed by the British following the Rising of Easter Week, 1916. Eamon Ceannt was

-2.

succeeded as Captain of "A" Company by Seamus Murphy who retained that appointment until the re-organisation of the Irish Volunteers early in 1917. Seamus Murphy also held the position of Adjutant of the Fourth Battalion.

I had no military training previous to joining the Irish Volunteers and this was the case with the majority of the other members of "A" Company. Approximately 10%, however, had some previous knowledge of military matters as past members of the British Army or members of the Irish Citizen Army or Fianna na hÉireann, the latter being the national boy scout movement. The early training of "A" Company was carried out under the supervision of a British Army Reservist N.C.O. who was paid for his services. This man was competent to give instruction from current British Army Manuals on squad, section, company and battalion close and open order drill with and without arms, musketry, bayonet fighting, military ceremonial and elementary tactics. He was called up for active service with the British Army when the 1914-1918 war commenced and was replaced by another ex-British Army N.C.O. with similar qualifications who continued in the employment of the Irish Volunteers until November or December, 1914.

The training of "A" Company was carried out on each Monday night between the hours of 8 and 10 and was supplemented by special classes for N.C.O's and officers on other nights during the week and very frequently Sundays. The training was specially valuable in developing discipline. Progress was slow, however, and the Company had reached only a fair state of efficiency by August, 1914 in close and open order drill, arms drill and bayonet fighting but remained decidedly weak in musketry and elementary tactics particularly tactics of the nature that had to be brought

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- 3 -

into operation during the situation that developed in the period subsequent to the 1916 Rising. This weakness was not due to any lack of enthusiasm but rather to lack of the necessary appliances and the fact that practically all the officers and the N.C.O's were without experience.

The only training material at the disposal of "A" Company during 1914 consisted of a number of dummy rifles formed by fitting a length of metal gas tubing to a piece of wood in the shape of a rifle stock, an aiming rest, aiming cards, a small number of .22 bore miniature rifles, the property of the Battalion Headquarters and individual members, and a 25 yards miniature rifle range. A small number of serviceable rifles, revolvers and pistols, the property of individual members, were frequently utilised for demonstration purposes.

"A" Company, in common with all the other Companies in the Fourth Battalion and the Dublin Brigade was organised in 4 sections each section consisting of 2 squads formed on a residential basis in such manner as to facilitate rapid mobilisation. Each squad was in charge of a Squad-Commander and each section was in charge of a ` Section Commander or Sergeant. Numbers 1 and 2 Sections were in charge of a First Lieutenent and numbers 3 and 4 Sections in charge of a Second Lieutenant. The Company Staff consisted of the Company Captain, the two Lieutenants mentioned, a Company Adjutant and a Company Quarter-master the two latter ranking as senior N.C.O's. This organisation proved suitable and was maintained up to July, 1921 with the addition during the period subsequent to the 1916 Rising of a Company Intelligence Officer also ranking as a senior N.C.O.

As a member of the Irish Volunteers I paid a weekly subscription of threepence towards the expenses of "A" Company. In addition I paid for my own uniform, equipment,

- 4 -

boots, arms and ammunition. In my own case it did not happen to be necessary for the Company to advance me money for these purposes but I am aware that this was done in many cases and the money repaid in instalments willingly and at appreciable personal sacrifice:

My uniform up to December, 1915 consisted of a green tunic with blue facings and brass buttons with a harp design, green breeches, green puttees and a cap with a black glazed peak. My arms consisted of a Lee-Enfield magazine rifle, 100 rounds of .303 ammunition and bayonet. My equipment consisted of a leather belt, leather bandolier, haversack, water-bottle, trench tool, bayonet frog and whistle; in addition I carried a notebook and first field dressing. In December, 1915 I was promoted from the rank of Company Adjutant to that of Second Lieutenant. I had then to provide at my own expense a tunic of the officer pattern, a Sam-Brown belt and a .380 revolver with 50 rounds of ammunition. I had held in succession the ranks of Squad-Commander, Section-Commander, Company Adjutant until I was promoted to the rank of Second Lieutenant and again to First Lieutenant of "A" Company early in 1916.

In the early months recruiting for the Irish Volunteers was slow. The recruits were, however, of an excellent type. There was no age limit but the majority of the members were between the ages of 19 and 35 and well up to the general average in physique and intelligence. The appeal of the Irish Volunteers was to the man who was giving thought to his country's affairs and a very high proportion of the members were or had been actively associated with the more advanced political and cultural

- 5 -

organisations, e.g. the Gaelic League, Sinn Fein, the G.A.A. and the Irish Republican Brotherhood. The movement seemed to make a special appeal to the best class of tradesmen; the membership of "A" Company was largely comprised of tradesmen, commercial clerks and shop assistants with a sprinkling of teachers, municipal officers, civil servants and students.

The training of "A" Company and the Fourth Battalion continued to make fair progress up to July, 1914. Greater progress could have been made were it not for the falling away of an appreciable number of recruits whose enthusiasm was not sufficiently strong to overcome the monotony of necessary routine drill and other military exercises. At this stage "A" Company had a nominal strength of 120 with parades averaging between 60 and 80.

Following the intervention of the Irish Parliementary Party in the affairs of the Irish Volunteers recruiting increased to a very considerable extent and was further very greatly accelerated by the events following the landing of rifles at Howth in July, 1914.

"A" Company participated in the landing of the rifles at Howth on Sunday the 26th July, 1914. The Company assembled at Croydon Park, Fairview, on that Sunday morning under the command of Eamon Ceannt and I was present carrying haversack, bandolier, water-bottle, belt and rations for one meal. The Company was quickly paraded with the remaining Companies of the Fourth Battalion and the other Dublin City Battalions and moved off on a forced march by the main road to Howth. "A" Company paraded about 60 strong on the occasion and the members were not informed of the real purpose before the event. The marching pace set was: severe but the Company arrived at the destination

- 6 -

in good condition. The landing and distribution of the rifles at Howth was carried out expeditiously and "A" Company, as was the case with all the other units participating, turned round for the return march to Dublin immediately each member had received a rifle.

The march back to Dublin was even more severe than the outward march; there was no time for a meal, the day was seasonably warm and the rifles, though a welcome burden, represented a substantial weight for inexperienced men who had already carried out a forced march. Nevertheless "A" Company arrived at the junction of the Malahide Road with Fairview in good order and condition. At this stage the march of the Irish Volunteers was stopped by a large party of Royal Irish Constabulary and British Military. On the Volunteers persisting shots were fired, there was subsequently considerable confusion. and ranks were broken. In the course of this incident one member of "A" Company was wounded, though not seriously, and there was a small number of minor injuries. The members of "A" Company made their way back to their homes some with the rifles in their possession others after arranging for the safe custody of the rifles with local friends or sympathisers. All the rifles distributed to "A" Company at Howth were subsequently accounted for not one being lost.

The rifles landed at Howth in July, 1914 were 11 m.m. Mauser single shot of 1866 pattern. They were heavy and not to be compared with the current magazine rifle of smaller bore but nevertheless they were a serviceable weapon. The bullet was uncased lead and the charge was black powder.

The incidents following the landing of the rifles at Howth in July, 1914 particularly the shooting of

- 7 -

civilians at Bachelor's Walk, Dublin, by a party of British Military led to an immediate and substantial increase in the flow of recruits to the Irish Volunteers. The nominal roll of "A" Company increased by 50% to between 150 and 200 at this stage. This process continued on the outbreak of the European War in August, 1914 and the declaration of the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party associating Ireland with the cause of Great Britain and her Allies against Germany and Austria.

The immediate result of the declaration made by the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party so far as the rank and file of "A" Company was concerned was intense dissatisfaction. On the one hand members who had associations or sympathies with the advanced political and cultural movements strongly objected to the association with Great Britain's cause and regarded the European war as an opportunity to secure the independence of Ireland by force of arms. On the other hand those who agreed with the leader of the Irish Parliementary Party, and they formed a majority, considered that the Party should be supported even to the extent of members joining the British Army for service in France or elsewhere overseas. This dissatisfaction was general and culminated in the split when nominees of the Irish Parliementary Party serving on the Provisional Committee of the Irish Volunteers were dismissed and set up a rival organisation called the Irish National Volunteers. This new body appealed for support and in consequence the nominal roll of "A" Company dropped to 40 with an average parade strength of between 25 and 30.

It was at this stage that "A" Company commenced to become an efficient military unit. The officers were no

- 8 -

longer burdened with the handling of a large body of men many of whom were strangers to them and for the first time felt that they had the full confidence of the men. In consequence the officers were accepted by the men as leaders in a movement that had a serious purpose and personal associations were formed which were invaluable to efficiency and esprit de corps.

In September, 1914 "A" Company was completely re-organised. The officers were Seamus Murphy (Captain) T.D. O'Brien (1st Lieutenant) and Henry Nichols (2nd Lieutenant) and possessed uniforms and serviceable revolvers. About one half of the N.C.O.'s and men possessed uniforms and were armed with "Howth" rifles in the second second second second second second second (11 m.m. Mauser), .303 Lee-Enfield or Lee-Matford, revolvers or shot-guns. All officers, N.C.O.'s and men possessed equipment consisting of belt, ammunition pouches or bandoliers, water-bottles, haversacks and a first field dressing.

From September, 1914 onwards slow but steady progress was made by "A" Company in training, organisation, recruiting, armament and equipment notwithstanding the fact that the Irish Volunteer Movement continued to be unpopular, even despised, at times, by the great majority of the public. The result of this attitude on the part of the public was to draw the officers, N.C.O.'s and men closer together and to ensure that only the best quality recruit offered for service. During 1915 this steady progress was maintained and the feeling of confidence in the military effectiveness of the Irish Volunteers as a whole and of the Fourth Battalion in particular continued to grow amongst the members of "A" Company. At the time . of the O'Donovan-Rossa funeral in August, 1915 the men of the Irish Volunteers in the Dublin area was excellent

- 9 -

and the attitude of the general public, though not actively sympathetic, was no longer severely hostile.

Arms and equipment continued to be gathered by "A" Company during this period the necessary funds being found primarily from the members' own subscriptions, and the proceeds of goose-clubs, an occasional Aireadhacht and grants from Headquarters. Arms and equipment in small quantities were purchased from British soldiers home on leave from the European war or who had access to barracks' stores and "A" Company shared in this spoil. All evailable sources of supply were tapped including gun-smiths, private owners, second-hand shops, commercial explosive dumps and no opportunity to obtain arms and equipment was neglected.

So far as my own personal knowledge goes the Headquarters' officers connected with the distribution of arms purchased abroad to the various Companies were The O'Rahilly, Michael Staines and M. W. O'Reilly. My function was merely to collect arms (revolvers on each occasion) from these officers at No.2, Dawson Street and bring them to "Larkfield". I was instructed to resist if interfered with by the police but it was not necessary to carry out these instructions as beyond being followed by detectives, obviously as routine duty, no other action was taken.

Training was intensified during this period. The officers' classes were re-organised and special classes for recruits, signallers and engineers were established. Rifle and revolver marksmanship was encouraged by the holding of competitions. The importance of the N.C.O. was recognised by providing special parades for all the N.C.O.'s of the four Dublin Battalions which were held in Camden Row each Saturday afternoon and at which there was an average

- 10 -

attendance of 100 to 150. These parades were in charge of Eimear O'Duffy who had been a member of the Officers' Training Corps attached to Trinity College, Dublin, and who possessed a first class knowledge of Company, Section and Squad close-order and open-order drill. I acted as Adjutant to Mr. O'Duffy on these occasions and the keeness, efficiency and soldierly appearance of these N.C.O.'s made a lasting impression on me.

There was greater concentration during this period on field exercises both by day and night. As the officers grew more experienced their exercises grew more realistic but there was no specialisation in Street fighting In fact the only exercise of this nature that exercises. had a bearing on the actual events of the 1916 Rising so far as "A" Company was concerned was a march through the area garrisoned by the Fourth Battalion presumably with the object of familiarising the officers with the geography of the area. To the best of my recollection, 33 years after the event, this march took place 5 or 6 weeks prior to the Rising. The officers, N.C.O.'s and men were, however, lectured on street fighting and there were demonstrations as to the use of explosives.

Training, organising, the gathering of arms and equipment continued without abatement until April, 1916. A Battalion Staff was organised and the consequent vacancies in the officer lists in the various Companies were filled by election which, at that time, was the system for promotion, the promotions in all cases being subject to ratification by General Headquarters. The general feeling of the officers and men was one of expectancy and their morale was very high. "A" Company was visited very frequently by Eamon Ceannt, its first Captain, and then Commandant of

- 11 -

the Fourth Battalion, and about a week previous to the 1916 Rising he addressed the Company informing the members that at any time they might be called out on active service and exhorting them to be ready to answer any call made on them; short of announcing the actual date and plan for the Rising Eamon Ceannt forecast that event in the course of this address. Patrick Pearse also visited the Company frequently but never addressed the members as his quiet reserved gentle yet purposeful menner a body; very greatly impressed the members. William Pearse sometimes accompanied his brother but so far as I could see made no particular impression. Sean McDermott also paid the Company an occasional visit and though he was a complete stranger to me and to many of my comrades in "A" Company he impressed me, as I am certain he did them, as an outstanding personality inspiring extreme respect and Cathal Brughs, as Vice-Commandant of the Fourth devotion. Battalion, was frequently present at parades of "A" Company and at that stage it was obvious to me that he was a fearless fighter and a hard hater of everything British but that he did not possess the personal qualities that inspired the respect and regard shown to Patrick Pearse, Eamon Ceannt, Sean McDermott and Con. Colbert.

I became a member of the Teeling Circle of the Irish Republican Brotherhood in November or December, 1915. I was approached by Eamon Ceannt a few weeks previously who informed me that he assumed that I understood that the Irish Volunteers might at any time have to face a serious situation and that it might be necessary to carry on the organisation underground. He stated that it was considered desirable, therefore, to invite officers and men who were regarded as dependable to become members of

- 12 -

the Secret organisation. Eamon Ceannt enquired if I had any conscientious scruples in the matter and on my replying that I had not he invited me to attend at his private residence where I was sworn in by him and instructed to attend the next meeting of the Teeling Circle which met once monthly at the Dublin Typographical Society's premises in Lower Gardiner Street, Dublin.

Bulmer Hobson was Chairman of the Teeling Circle and with one exception the meetings which I attended were routine affairs at which nothing of note occurred. The exception was the last meeting prior to the Easter Week Rising, 1916. At that meeting the Chairman made a speech to the members, of which there were about 20 present, in the course of which he indicated that a crisis was approaching and that there was every likelihood of an armed conflict with the British. The Cheirman spoke in general terms and gave no particulars of any plans; in short his remarks were in the nature of an "alert" and were taken very seriously by those present. I did not report back to the Irish Republican Brotherhood after the Easter, 1916 Insurrection taking the view, as did many of my comrades, that having regard to the proclamation of the Irish Republic on that occasion there was no longer any necessity for a secret oath bound Society.

During Holy Week, 1916 the final preparations were made to meet the crisis which by that time all members of "A" Company and the 4th Battalion were quite satisfied was imminent. It was during this week that I first saw hand grenades prepared. These were prepared by members of the Fourth Battalion at "Larkfield" Kimmage by packing a small meat or tomato can with motor cycle ball-bearings using gelignite as the explosive and inserting a fuse which could be ignited by a match. I saw about 50 of these grenades prepared and they were by no means the formidable weapon

- 13 -

that may appear from the description I have given. In fact they were crude, dangerous to handle and of questionable value except possibly for demoralisation purposes given suitable circumstances which did not arise.

On the eve of the 1916 Rising the strength, equipment and armament of "A" Company was as follows:-

Strength.

Captain: Seamus Murphy.

1st Lieutenant: Henry S. Murray.

2nd Lieutenant: Sean O'Byrne.

Company Adjutant.

4 Section Commanders.

8 Squad Commanders.

40 Volunteers 56 Total.

Equipment.

Approximately 50% possessed uniform as previously described. All possessed equipment as previously described.

Arms.

7 Serviceable Revolvers and Ammunition.

15.303 serviceable rifles of various patterns and ammunition.

20 11 m.m. Mauser (Howth) rifles and ammunition.

6 Single bore shot-guns.

Note: There were at least 50 rounds of ammunition available for each of these weapons.

At that time the officer personnel of the Fourth Battalion was as follows:-

Battalion Staff.

Commandant: Eamon Ceannt.

Vice-Commandant: Cathal Brugha.

- 14 -

Adjutant: Seamus Murphy

(also Captain of "A" Company) Quartermaster: James Kenny. Assistant Quartermaster: Philip Cosgrave. Staff Officers: T. D. O'Brien.

H. Nicholls.

Sean McGlynn. Gerald F. Murray. "Wilsey" Byrne. Garret Byrne.

"A" Company.

Captain: Seamus Murphy. First Lieutenant: Henry S. Murray. Second Lieutenant: Sean O'Byrne.

"B" Company.

Captain: George Irvine. First Lieutenant: W. T. Cosgrave. Second Lieutenant: W. Corrigan.

"C" Company.

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Captain: Thomas MacCarthy. First Lieutenant: P. Egan. Second Lieutenant: C. O'Grady.

"D" Company.

Captain: Douglas ffrench-Mullen. First Lieutenant: Joseph McGrath. Second Lieutenant: Liam O'Brien.

"E" Company.

Captain: Patrick H. Pearse. First Lieutenant: Liam Clarke. Second Lieutenant: M. Boland.

"F" Company.

Captain: Con. Colbert. First Lieutenant: Christopher Byrne. Second Lieutenant: L. Murtagh.

"En Company, 4th Battalion was regarded as a Headquarters' Company only nominally attached to the Fourth Battalion. The Captain of this Company was P. H. Pearse and the Company formed part of the G.P.O. Garrison during Easter Week, 1916.

I am unable to give the nominal strength of each of the remaining Companies of the Fourth Battalion on the eve of the Rising nor am I in a position to give particulars of the armament and equipment possessed by these Companies but generally the particulars which I have given for "A" Company could be regarded as a fair average.

In response to the general orders that had been issued I proceeded on Easter Sunday to report to Battalion Headquarters at "Larkfield" Kimmage. I had previously read Eoin MacNeill's statement in that day's issue of the "Sunday Independent" but decided to carry on pending instructions from my Company Captain. On my way I met a large number of members of the Fourth Battalion many of whom were confused and uncertain as to the action that they should take; it was obvious that all were convinced that a crisis of some nature had arisen but there was no hint from anyone that I met of divided councils at Headquarters. Shortly before reaching "Larkfield" I was accosted by David Sears, a young Volunteer attached to "C" Company, Fourth Battalion, who, in a state of great agitation, pleaded with me and those accompanying me to return home

at once and await orders; this plea was impressive as David Sears was the son of William Sears then proprietor of the "Enniscorthy Echo" and a man who was active in advanced political pircles. Nevertheless I proceeded to "Larkfield" and after some delay received a message from my Company Captain (Seamus Murphy) to the effect that the parade fixed for that day had been cancelled and that there were no further instructions.

At about 9 o'clock in the morning of Easter Monday 1916 my Company Captain, Seamus Murphy, called at my residence and instructed me to mobilise numbers 1 and 2 Sections of "A" Company for which I was responsible and parade them at "Larkfield", Kimmage at 10 o'clock on the same morning. He told me that the situation was serious but gave me no indication that active service was imminent. I duly reported at "Larkfield" and was instructed by Seamus Murphy to return to my home and bring back the Company flag. This flag was presented to "A" Company by . Patrick Pearse in the previous September as the winner of a competition for the best equipped and best trained Section which was open to the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army; the flag was recovered after the Rising and is at present in the National Museum, Dublin, together with photographs of the winning Section of which I was in command.

On my return with the flag to "Larkfield" I reported and was ordered by Seamus Murphy to remain in "Larkfield" until noon, collect all Volunteers who might report up to that hour and proceed without delay to rejoin "A" Company at Emerald Square, Dolphin's Barn. I left "Larkfield" at noon accompanied by 6 Volunteers on bicycles and at

- 17 -

Emmet Bridge, Harold's Cross heard rifle fire from the direction of Portobello Bridge. This was the first intimation I received that I was on active service. Beyond extending my party I took no particular precautions and proceeded to Emerald Square where I arrived at about On arrival I found that the Fourth Battalion, 12.15 p.m. including "A" Company had left and that a very hostile crowd of civilians had gathered. These civilians subjected my party to considerable verbal abuse in the course of which the direction taken by the Fourth Battalion was revealed and on following this direction I arrived at Marrowbone Lane Distillery premises just as the occupation was about to be completed and the main gate closed. Seamus Murphy was the officer in charge and he had allocated various positions to his command which consisted at that time of approximately 50 officers and men and 20 members of Cumann-na-mBan.

It was notable from the celerity with which Seamus Murphy's orders were carried out that the lectures on street fighting had not been without effect; communications between the various positions in the building were very Quickly established and protected, where necessary. A substantial reserve supply of water was collected, the exits barricaded and guards posted, all within a short time; ammunition and equipment were distributed by the Battalion Quartermaster where required and arrangements for cooking meals completed.

On reporting to Seamus Murphy I was detailed by him to take charge of 15 men placed in the malting loft and adjacent passages. Beyond orders to keep any enemy movements under observation and to return fire if fired upon

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- 18 -

I received no particular orders from Seamus Murphy at this stage but he informed me that the South Dublin Union had been occupied by Eamon Ceannt and that movement by the enemy on my immediate front in that direction was During the afternoon of Easter Monday and on possible. the following day my position was subjected to desultory rifle fire from the direction of Rialto Bridge where a small body of British troops was located; this fire was returned but as the British troops were under good cover on the far side of the canal bank near Rialto Bridge the result could not be observed. ' The Volunteers reacted very well to this first experience of rifle fire and after the initial nervous excitement had dissipated carried out their orders coolly and maintained perfect discipline. There was one casualty in consequence of these exchanges . of rifle fire a Volunteer receiving a head wound which did not, however, prove to be of a serious nature.

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Beyond the desultory rifle fire mentioned Monday and Tuesday passed without incident except that it was found necessary in order to avoid fire in consequence of spontaneous combustion to provide a working party to keep the malting barley turned. On Wednesday and Thursday British troops opened rifle fire on Marrowbone Lane Distillery from a number of positions and sniping increased though without effect except on the nerves of the Volunteers very many of whom were forced to remain inactive. In the course of these activities two British soldiers were killed in the immediate vicinity and a night patrol was forced to retire after a short exchange of fire. No attempt at a serious assault on Marrowbone Lane Distillery was made by the British at any stage of the Rising nor did the British use artillery.

Early in Easter Week, 1916 the adjacent posts at Roe's Distillery and Watkins Brewery were evacuated by the units of the Fourth Battalion detailed to occupy these positions. The unit holding Watkins Brewery under Con. Colbert reported in a body to Seamus Murphy at Marrowbone Lane Distillery and many members of the garrison at Roe's Distillery reported individually. The garrison at Marrowbone Lane Distillery was further augmented by the arrival of many individuals from different units who had failed to report on Easter Monday morning for various valid reasons and at the time of the surrender on the following Sunday the strength of the garrison was as follows:

Battalion Staff:	3
"A" Company:	25
"B" Company:	4
"C" Company:	43
"D" Company:	8
"F" Company:	30
Cumann-na-mBan:	23
Fianna:	7
"C" Co. 3rd Battalion:	1
Irish Citizen Army:	<u> </u>
Total:	145

Except for occasional aniping on both sides Friday and Saturday passed quietly. Several attempts were made by Seamus Murphy to establish communication with Eamon Ceannt at the South Dublin Union seeking orders but these efforts failed; flag signalling proved ineffective and runners failed to get through. The officers of the garrison notably Con. Colbert and Joseph McGrath were extremely dissatisfied with this situation and at a meeting with Seamus Murphy at which I and all the other officers

- 20 -

of the Garrison were present which took place on Friday evening it was decided that the members of the Garrison would move out on the following Sunday failing the receipt of orders to the contrary. The intention was that the Garrison should fight its way to the South Dublin Union or other posts. This intention had not been put into operation when information was received by Seamus Murphy of the general surrender. On Sunday morning Eamon Ceannt accompanied by a British Officer in uniform heading the surviving members of the South Dublin Union Garrison arrived at Marrowbone Lane Distillery and the garrison of the latter post under Seemus Murphy falling in behind the whole body proceeded to Patrick's Park. On arrival at Patrick's Park the members of the South Dublin Union and Marrowbone Lane Distillery Garrisons formed into line and acting under Eamon Ceannt's order laid down their arms and divested themselves of all equipment. The members of the Marrowbone Lane Distillery Garrison in particular were deeply humiliated; the opportunity of using the arms and equipment which had been obtained at so much personal sacrifice to the same extent as the members of other garrisons had been denied to them and they could not understand the necessity for surrender. But beyond the display of some emotion there were no incidents and discipline was maintained. Shortly after this laying down of arms and equipment the members of the two garrisons escorted by heavily armed British troops were marched off as prisoners to the then Richmond Barracks. During this march there was every indication of the strongest hostility to the prisoners on the part of the civilians who lined the route but I saw no evidence of improper conduct towards the prisoners by British soldiers.

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- 21 -

Richmond Barracks was merely a collection centre for prisoners and there was gross over-crowding and other disabilities for the prisoners which were inevitable in the circumstances. The main body of the prisoners were despondent but the leaders, notably Eamon Ceannt, Major McBride and Con. Colbert were resigned and cheerful, their invariable answer to the natural questioning of the men as to their fate being that "they will probably shoot us and let you fellows off with a few months in jail or internment for the duration of the war". Eamon Ceannt in particular urged the men in my presence to look to the future and not to regard the collapse of the Rising as the end but rather as the commencement of a fresh and better effort; at the same time he expressed his personal view that the surrender was a mistake and that he would have preferred to continue the fight. This attitude of Eemon Ceannt and the gallant cheerful bearing of Con. Colbert impressed the men and an air of quiet determination rapidly succeeded the previous general despondency.

From Richmond Barracks I was deported to England and incarcerated in Knutsford Military Prison and later interned in Frongoch Internment Camp, North Wales. The treatment of the prisoners so far as my experience went was not unduly harsh and though there were hardships these were not greater than could reasonably be expected in the circumstances. I saw no evidence of the brutal treatment of any Irish prisoners.

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Frongoch Internment Camp became in a sense an Irish Military College; those prisoners who had acquired military knowledge or possessed knowledge of military value were organised to impart this knowledge to others; friendships and associations were established which proved invaluable in

- 22 -

the later struggle and above all there was built up an esprit de corps without which the later struggle could not have succeeded.

I was released from Frongoch Internment Camp in September, 1916 and returned to Dublin.

Following is the distribution of the officer personnel and members of the various Companies of the Fourth Battalion (with the exception of "E" Company) among the various garrisons held during the 1916 Rising. <u>Marrowbone Lane Distillery</u>.

Captain Seamus Murphy (Battalion Adjutant and Captain "A" Company).

Captain Con. Colbert (Captain "F" Company). Captain J. Kenny (Battalion Quartermaster). Lieutenant P. Cosgrave (Assistant Battalion Quarter-

master).

lst L	ieutenant	H.	S. Murray.	u¥n	Company.
2nd L	ieutenant	s.	O'Byrne.	u¥ u	Company.
lst L	ieutenant	J.	McGrath.	"D"	Company.
lst L	ieutenant	c.	O'Byrne.	u Ba	Company.

N.C.O.'s and men.

"A" Company		23.
"B" Company	:	4
"C" Company	;	43
"D" Company	с 1	7
"F" Company		28

Other units.

Fianna Eireann	7
"C" Company Third	1
Battalion.	
Irish Citizen Army	. 1
Cumann-na-mBan	23
Grand Total	145

South Dublin Union.

Commandant Eamon Ceannt (Battalion Commandant) Vice-Commandant C. Brugha (Battalion Vice-Commandant) Lieutenant Sean McGlynn (Staff) Lieutenant G. F. Murray (Staff) Lieutenant W. Byrne (Staff) Captain George Irvine (Captain "B" Company) Captain D. ffrench-Mullen (Captain "D" Company) 1st Lieutenant W. T. Cosgrave "B" Company. 2nd Lieutenant W. Corrigan "B" Company. 2nd Lieutenant L. O'Brien "D" Company.

N.C.O.'s and men.

Grand Total:	75
"F" Company	2
"D" Company	11
"C" Company	22
"B" Company	19
"A" Company	11

Roe's Distillery.

lst Lieutenant P. Egan "C" Company. 2nd Lieutenant C. O'Grady "C" Company.

N.C.O.'s and men.

16

Grand Total: 18

General Post Office.

N.	с.	٥.	18	and	men.	
				() and		

"A"	Company	2
u:Bu	Company	2
nC'n	Company	2
" D":	Company	l
n Đu	Company	4
× .	Total:	11

College of Surgeons.

Lieutenant H. Nicholls (Battalion Staff)

Total: 1

Four Courts.

Lieutenant L. Murtagh ("F" Company)

N.C.O.'s and men

"D"	Company	4
u:Em	Company	7
Tot	tal:	12

Grand Total

Marrowbone Lane:

	Officers,	N.C.O.'s	and men	115	
			women	23	
			Fianna	7	145
South	75				
Roe's	18(2)				
Gener	al Post Of:	fice			11
College of Surgeons					1
Four	Courts				12
					262(1)

- Notes: (1) The officers, N.C.O.'s and men of "E" Company 4th Battalion which Company was posted to the G.P.O. Garrison are not included in the sbove total, nor is Lieutenant Garrett Byrne, Battalion Staff who was employed on a special mission under orders from Commandant Eamon Ceannt the precise nature of which I am not aware.
 - (2) Roe's Distillery was evacuated early in Easter Week and a number of members of the Garrison made their way as individuals to Marrowbone Lane Distillery and are included in the figure for the latter post.

The members of Fianna Éireann attached to Marrowbone Lane Distillery were used as runners by Seamus Murphy but I am not in a position to state if they were fully effective. I can say, however, that communications were established with the garrison in Jacob's Factory. I have already recorded that attempts to establish communications with the South Dublin Union from Thursday onwards were unsuccessful.

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The 23 members of the Cumann-na-mBan detailed to Marrowbone Lane Distillery were in charge of Vice-Commandant Miss Rose MacNamara assisted by Quartermaster Miss Marcella Cosgrave. Beyond assisting at cooking for the garrison, attending to a small number of slight casualties and carrying messages the services of these women were not required. Their behaviour in the trying circumstances was excellent and they earned the respect and admiration of their male comrades for their coolness, discipline and eagerness to render service.

On Easter Tuesday Marrowbone Lane Distillery was visited by two Passionist priests from Mt. Argus who heard Confessions and this action was very greatly appreciated by the members of the Garrison.

Part II of my statement covering the period from the release of the Irish Prisoners from Frongoch to the signing of the Treaty with Great Britain in December, 1921 will follow.

Signed.

Hung S. humach.

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16tt June, 1949.

- 26 -